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POST-RACIALISM AND SEARCHES INCIDENT TO
ARREST
Frank Rudy Cooper
For 28 years the Court held that an officer's search incident to arrest
powers automatically extended to the entire passenger compartment of a
vehicle. In 2009, however, the Arizona v. Gant decision held that officers do
not get to search a vehicle incident to arrest unless they satisfy (1) the
Chimel v. California Court's requirement that the suspect has access to
weapons or evanescent evidence therein or (2) the United States v.
Rabinowitz Court's requirement that the officer reasonably believe
evidence of the crime of arrest will be found therein. While many scholars
read Gant as a triumph for civil liberties, I see it as a failure to fully
address racialprofiling.
Racial profiling lives on in the post-Gant era because the Court failed to
prohibitpretextual searches. Cops may leave suspects near a car in order
to satisfy Gant's first prong. More importantly, they will often be able to
characterizethe crime of arrestas suggesting there could be evidence in the
car. For instance, if a distracteddriver turns without signaling, what is to
stop an officer from claiming she suspected the crime of Driving Under the
Influence and was searchingfor beer cans? Nothing in the Gant decision.
The Gant Court fails to address pretext because it takes a post-racial
approach to racialprofiling. That is, it acts as if race never matters by
trying to address a problem of racism through a broader category of
analysis. In Gant, that means ignoring former Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's warning in her Atwater v. City of Lago Vista dissent that the
search incident to arrest rule is used for racialprofiling. The Gant Court
thus remedies only the generalproblem of officers searchingfor weapons
after they have eliminated any safety concerns but not the specific problem
of racialprofiling through searches incident to arrest.
*.
Copyright 2012 Frank Rudy Cooper, all rights reserved. Professor, Suffolk University
Law School. I thank my wonderful wife Daniella Courban, my research assistants, Raeha
Blouin and Lia Marino, and research librarian, Diane D'Angelo. I also thank Chris Dearborn,
Kathleen Engel, Kim McLaurin, Eric Miller, Song Richardson, and Ragini Shah. I presented
versions of this article at the 2010 John Mercer Langston Writing Workshop, National People of
Color legal scholarship conference, and LatCrit conference. Special thanks to the staff of the
Arizona State Law Journal.
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Prior to Gant, scholar Donald Dripps identified an "Iron Triangle" of
cases that made search incident to arrest doctrine inimical to civil liberties;
I extend that metaphor andargue the problem of racialprofilingstems from
a "Mindless Square" of cases. Dripps points to the combination of New
York v. Belton's presumption that a car may be searched,Whren v. United
States's bar on considering officer motivations, and Atwater's approval of
arrestsfor de minimis crimes. I point out that these cases draw on the
earlier United States v. Robinson case's refusal to consider whether the
officer actually had the state of mind that Chimel says justifies the search
incident to arrest rule. Together, Robinson, Belton, Whren, and Atwater
remove the officer's mind fom analysis of search incident to arrest
doctrine.
In order to address post-Gant racial profiling, we must address the
mindlessness of present doctrine. That means reinvigorating Chimel by
excising the Rabinowitz prongfrom the search incident to arrest of vehicles
rule. It also means explicitly asking whether it is overall reasonable to
allow a search incident to arrest while considering if the arrest was a
pretextfor racialprofiling.
If criminal procedure of the mid-twentieth century can be understood as
a type of civil rights law,' criminal procedure of the early twenty-first
century might come to be understood as an attempt to construct a post-racial
era. Post-racialism is the notion that the United States has reached a point
where race is so infrequently salient that it no longer makes sense to
organize around it or even acknowledge its presence.2 We are to be race1. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6869 (2007); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins ofModern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.

REV. 48, 88-89 (2000).
Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-racialism and the Gates Controversy: The
2.
False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1 (2010); see also Anthony V.
Alfieri, Post-Racialism in the Inner City: Structure and Culture in Lawyering, 98 GEO L.J. 921

(2010) (addressing "post-racialism" in the context of literature on inner-city cultures); Mario L.
Barnes, Reflection on a Dream World: Race, Post-race,and the Question of Making it Over, 11
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 6 (2009) [hereinafter Barnes, Reflection on a Dream World]
(critiquing notion that we are "post-race"); Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones,
A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010) [hereinafter Barnes et al., Post-Race

Equal Protection] (considering ways to invigorate equal protection doctrine in the "post-racial"
era); Christopher A. Bracey, The Color of OurFuture: The Pitfalls andPossibilitiesof the Race

Card in American Culture, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 94-95 (2009) (book review) (arguing
whites "play the race card" by accepting past and present benefits of white status); Sumi Cho,
Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009) (explicating and critiquing "post-racialism"); Ian
F. Haney L6pez, Post-RacialRacism: Policing Race in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV.
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silent, even when we try to address issues that correlate closely with race.
The problem is, there are many examples of ongoing disparate negative
treatment of racial minorities, such as racial profiling.3 Post-racialism would
seem to suggest taking a race-silent approach to racial profiling. The main
way police officers racial profile minorities as criminals is by obtaining
probable cause to arrest based on a minor traffic violation and then
searching the suspect and her vehicle incident to that arrest. So a postracialist might curb police officers' search incident to arrest discretion in
general without explaining the necessity for the curbs on the basis of race or
tailoring the remedy to address race. As a case study in whether race-silent
measures are as effective as directly attacking racism, this article considers
the Court's doctrine governing police searches of vehicles incident to
arrests.
The Court's vehicle search doctrine is a branch of its overall searches
incident to arrest doctrine. Two early search incident to arrest cases conflict
with each other and set the stage for a debate as to the appropriate scope of
the doctrine. The United States v. Rabinowitz case contends that police
officers' evidence-gathering function means they should be able to search
anywhere in a home that evidence might be found whenever they have
probable cause to arrest a suspect.' The Chimel v. Californiacase later links
a police officer's full blown search powers in the home to twin rationales of
1023 (2010) (arguing colorblindness has led people to accept racial stratification in criminal
justice system); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, An Officer and a Gentleman: A "Post-Racial" Arrest
(2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the impact of the "post-racial"
discourse on the Gates discussion); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, The Obama
Effect: UnderstandingEmerging Meanings of "Obama" in AntidiscriminationLaw, 87 IND. L.J.

325 (2012) (discussing uses of Obama to impose post-racialism); John A. Powell, PostRacialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785 (2009) (critiquing post-

racialism as a cover for ongoing white supremacy); Girardeau A. Spann, DisparateImpact, 98
GEO. L.J. 1133 (2010) (arguing we should reinvigorate disparate impact theories of
discrimination in order to counter "post-racialism's" ignoring of intentional discrimination
theories); Julie C. Suk, Race Without Cards?, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 111 (2009) (reviewing
RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: How BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE
RELATIONS WORSE (2008)) (criticizing Richard Thompson Ford's "post-racialism").
3.
See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-BalancedFourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of
the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 852 (2002); James Forman,
Jr., Acknowledge Race in a "Post-Racial"Era: The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America's
Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 796 (2011) (briefly discussing racial profiling as an
experience all blacks confront); Dov Fox, The Second Generation ofRacial Profiling, 38 AM. J.

CRIM. L. 49, 66 (2010) (stating that police investigators are most interested in race in suspect
descriptions); Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen
Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000); see also Under Obama, Is America 'Post-Racial'?,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/21/under-obamais-america-post-racial?ref=opinion&nl=opinion&emc=tya3.
4.
See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1950).
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officer safety and prevention of destruction of evidence and thus limits the
search to the area in the "immediate control" of the suspect.' Justice Scalia
has claimed that both Rabinowitz and Chimel are "plausible" explanations
of the rationale for the search incident to arrest.6 In an early application of
the Chimel rule, the Court in United States v. Robinson held that an officer
could fully search the person of the suspect and his immediate area after
arresting him for a traffic violation.! Under the Robinson decision, a police
officer may make a search incident to arrest of a person even if she does not
have the state of mind of fear for either safety or evidence that justifies the
search incident rule.' The New York v. Belton case then created a
presumption that the entire passenger compartment of a car is within the
immediate control of a suspect and held that officers may search a vehicle's
passenger compartment incident to the arrest of the suspect for a traffic
violation.'
The full implications of the Belton doctrine were seen in the Whren v.
United States decision, in which the Court held that the fact that our traffic
laws are so pervasive that most people can be found in violation most days
does not require police to have anything other than probable cause of the
traffic violation before arresting the subject."o In conjunction with Belton's
permission to search, the Whren rule means that officers have the ability to
search most people's cars for evidence of major crimes upon a mere hunch
and a traffic violation." Moreover, the Whren Court explicitly holds that an
officer's subjective decision to use the traffic violation as a pretext to search
a racial minority for evidence of drug dealing solely because of her race is
irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.12 In the Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista case, the majority held that whenever police officers have probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed a traffic violation, they

5. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Scholar Edwin Butterfoss links
the shift to Chimel to the victory of the warrant preference approach to the Fourth Amendment
over the reasonableness approach, a victory that would prove ephemeral. Edwin J. Butterfoss,
Bright Line Breaking Point: EmbracingJustice Scalia's Callfor the Supreme Court to Abandon
an UnreasonableApproach to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L. REv. 77,

80 (2007).
6. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627-31 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). As
will become clear, I do not find Rabinowitz to be a plausible justification for the search incident
to arrest rule.
7. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
8. See id. at236.
See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
9.
10. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996).
11.

See id.

12.

See id.at 814-16.

44:0113]

POST-RA CIALISM

117

may arrest the suspect even for a minor, rarely-enforced violation carrying
no possible jail time."
Scholar Donald Dripps refers to the citizen vulnerability created by the
combination of Belton, Whren, and Atwater as the "Iron Triangle";14 We
might go further and refer to the combination of Robinson, Belton, Whren,
and Atwater as creating a "Mindless Square." Dripps is right that the
combination of Belton, Whren, and Atwater ends up making everything in
the passenger compartment of the car, including a locked glove box and
sealed containers, subject to search incident to arrest for a minor traffic
violation." Turning Dripps' Triangle into a Square emphasizes the
significance of Robinson's refusal to look at officers' states of mind to the
undoing of Chimel's limits on searches incident to arrest.
The recent Arizona v. Gant decision marks a turning point in search
incident to arrest law that places some limits on the discretion created by the
Mindless Square and may thereby limit racial profiling." The Gant decision
limits Belton searches to situations where the officer can establish either (1)
the Chimel rationales that the suspect has access to weapons or destructible
evidence or (2) the Rabinowitz rationale that there are reasonable grounds to
believe the officer will find evidence of the crime of arrest in the car."
Nonetheless, Gant never mentions the fact that racial minorities are much
more likely to suffer the consequences of an open-ended rule.
While many scholars read Gant as a triumph for civil liberties, I see it as
a failure to fully address racial profiling. Racial profiling lives on in the
post-Gant era because the Court failed to prohibit pretextual searches. Cops
may leave suspects near a car in order to satisfy Gant's first prong. More
importantly, they will often be able to characterize the crime of arrest as
suggesting there could be evidence in the car. For instance, if a distracted
driver turns without signaling, what is to stop an officer from claiming she
suspected the crime of Driving Under the Influence and was searching for
beer cans? Nothing in the Gant decision.
As Eric Miller and Song Richardson's articles in this symposium,
demonstrate, police officers are still prone to racial profiling." It would
13.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).

14. Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition:
Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 Miss. L.J. 341, 392-93

(2004).
15.

See generally id.

16.

See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

17. Id. at 351.
18. See Eric Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, and the Fourth Amendment, 44
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213 (2012); L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Policing, and the Fourth

Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267 (2012) (hereinafter Richardson, Cognitive Bias]; see also
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have made sense for the Gant decision to reference O'Connor's Atwater
dissent. There, she explicitly criticizes the Whren decision as allowing
racial profiling.19 By limiting a prime means of racial profiling-the bogus
traffic stop as pretext for a drug search-without acknowledging the racial
reasons for doing so, Gant uses a post-racial means to effect racial progress.
The core argument of this article is that the Court ought to extend the
Gant limitation on vehicle searches incident to arrest by excising its
Rabinowitz prong and requiring searches incident to be overall reasonable
in light of any racial pretext. 2 0 This would create a more race-sensitive
search incident to arrest doctrine.
I.

POST-RACIALISM

Post-racialism is about avoiding the acknowledgment of race. An
anecdote exemplifies this quality of post-racialism. A friend told me he was
talking to his eight-year-old son while the son watched television. The son
said he wanted a certain toy, but there were many children in the scene and
many of them were holding objects. The friend asked which toy. The son
said the kid on the left was holding it. The friend said, "which kid, the black
one?" The son said, "don't say that, it's not nice." The son explained that he
had gathered from school that he was never to refer to someone's race
because all people are the same. The friend asked, "was there a better way
to identify your toy?" There was not. Like the son, when people are in a
post-racial mode, they try to find broader, non-race categories for not only
identifying but also addressing social problems.2 '
Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters: Terry's "Seesaw Effect, " 56

OKLA.

L. REV. 833,

839 (2003); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1076 (2010); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the

Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2011) [hereinafter Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency] (arguing implicit bias leads police officers to racially profile).
19. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360-73 (2001).
20. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 239 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21. See Matt Bai, Is Obama the End ofBlack Politics?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 10, 2008,
at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/magazine/lOpolitics-t.html. In my
example, the child's refusal to acknowledge race reveals something important about postracialism: It incorporates a white perspective on race. Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual
Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2008). After all, who thinks it is insulting to point out
that someone is black? Those who have been told their race is superior. See Symposium, 50
Years Later: Brown in the Appellate Courts, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 11, 79 (2004) (noting

passing down of white supremacist notions). Simultaneously, though, whites have a lot to lose
in contemporary discussions about race. They might have to acknowledge that they are
privileged by their race. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). Apparently, Supreme Court Justice Clarence
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To understand post-racialism's goals, it is helpful to understand its
predecessor, colorblindness. Whereas colorblind ideology argued that
assuming that race does not matter is the best way to reach a racially
egalitarian society, 22 post-racialism declares that race already no longer
matters in societal interactions.23 Colorblindness is exemplified by Chief
Justice Roberts's statement: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 24 He seems to mean that
we should never act on the basis of having identified someone's race. 25 To
make race immaterial, we must act as though race is already immaterial.
Colorblindness implicitly accepts that people do see race but thinks a
society where people do not see race would be more egalitarian, and thus
advocates pretending we do not see race. 26
In contrast, post-racialism says that we have already reached a state
where race does not matter. 27 As a prime example of the overcoming of
racism, post-racialists point to the election of Barack Obama as the first
black President of this (for now) majority white nation. 28 Chris Matthews
reflected this idea when he said, "I forgot Obama was black for an hour."29
But even post-racialists probably do not mean that people literally no longer
ever see race. More likely, they mean that invidious racism is so infrequent
and so marginalized that race makes no practical difference in most
people's lives. The implication of colorblindness, and especially of postracialism, is that we should no longer organize around race-neither
socially nor through race-based legal remedies. Post-racialism is thus a
continuation of colorblindness in that it triumphantly declares that we have
reached the racially egalitarian state that colorblindness was seeking.

Thomas, whom some would refer to as an apologist for white privilege, has such a fear. See
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 781 n.30 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (referencing privilege).
22. See Cho, supra note 2, at 1598-1600; cf Paul Bender & Chelsea Sage Durkin, Justice
O'Connor's Race and Gender Jurisprudence, 39 ARiz. ST. L.J. 829, 841 (2007) (saying of
O'Connor's race jurisprudence, "The world she wants is one where you don't discriminate.").
23. Cho, supra note 2, at 1595 (noting post-racialism).
24. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 747.
25. See Jennifer Holladay & Catherine Smith, A Cautionary Tale: The Obama Coalition,
Anti-Subordination Principles and Proposition 8, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 819, 821 (2009)
(interpreting Roberts's statement).
26. See Trina Jones, Anti-DiscriminationLaw in Peril?,75 Mo. L. REV. 423, 433 (2010).
27. See Cho, supra note 2, at 1595.
28. Id. at 1595 ("Centuries of racial apartheid and neo-apartheid are. eclipsed by a
symbolic 'big event' signifying transcendent racial progress.").
29. See Kathy Kattenburg, Chris Matthews' Not Very Post-Racial Moment, MODERATE
VOICE (Jan. 28, 2010), http://themoderatevoice.com/60858/chris-matthews-not-very-post-racialmoment/ (criticizing Matthews for promoting stereotypes).

120

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Critical race theorists, having long challenged colorblindness,30 are dubious
about post-racialism.31
Critical race theorists seem to be on to something in the criminal
procedure context. In the context of the Fourth Amendment, post-racialism
conflicts with strong evidence of ongoing racial profiling by police
officers.32 For purposes of this Article, racial profiling occurs in the
following situations: When a profiler (say, a police officer seeking to
discriminate amongst potential suspects)" adopts a racial profile (say, the
stereotype of young black men as crime prone)34 and applies it as a way of
deciding how to act toward an individual from the profiled group. 5 Put
another way, racial profiling is "the inappropriate use of race, ethnicity, or
national origin."36 Scholars have shown that racial profiling is a pervasive

30.

See e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L.

REV. 1(1991) (critiquing call for colorblindness as conservative ideology).
31. On the critique of "post-racialism," see Christian B. Sundquist, Science Fictions and
Racial Fables: Navigating the Final Frontier of Genetic Interpretation, 25 HARV.
BLACKLETTER J. 57 (2009) (critiquing new forms of criminal profiling); see also Alfieri, supra

note 2 (addressing "post-racialism" in the context of literature on inner-city cultures); Barnes,
Reflection on a Dream World, supra note 2 (critiquing notion that we are "post-race"); Barnes
et al., Post-Race Equal Protection, supra note 2 (considering ways to invigorate equal
protection doctrine in the "post-racial" era); Bracey, supra note 2 (arguing whites "play the race
card" by accepting past and present benefits of white status); Cho, supra note 2 (arguing postracialism absolves whites of responsibility for past and present racism); L6pez, supra note 2
(arguing colorblindness has led people to accept racial stratification in criminal justice system);
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 2 (manuscript on file with author) (discussing the impact of the
"post-racial" discourse on the Gates discussion); Powell, supra note 2 (critiquing post-racialism
as a cover for ongoing white supremacy); Spann, supra note 2 (arguing we should reinvigorate
disparate impact theories of discrimination in order to counter post-racialism's ignoring of
intentional discrimination theories); Suk, supra note 2 (criticizing Richard Thompson Ford's
"post-racialism"). See generally Symposium: Defining Race, 72 ALBANY L. REV. 855 (2009)
(collecting essays addressing current racial issues).
32.

See Cooper, supra note 3, at 863; Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 18, at

2039.
33.

Cf Devon Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv. 946, 977

(2002) (posing scenario of officer who sees two groups of young males he wishes to stop, one
white and one black).
34. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 857 (2006)

(defining Bad Black Man image).
35.

See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen

Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1690 (2000) (breaking down components of racial profiling in
context of the false accusation that a Chinese-American scientist was a spy).
36. Deborah Ramirez & Stephanie Woldenberg, Balancing Security and Liberty in a PostSeptember 11th World: The Searchfor Common Sense in Domestic Counterterrorism Policy, 14
TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 495, 495 (2005).
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practice of U.S. police departments.37 They have also shown that the
practice is both ineffective" and detrimental in a number of ways.39
What then is a post-racialist to do about racial profiling? To understand
what a race-silent approach to racial profiling might look like, we might
turn to the jurisprudence of former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. O'Connor is an appropriate object of this inquiry because she
created much of the Court's colorblind Equal Protection doctrine and called
for a form of post-racialism before that term was widely used. She is known
for her colorblindness due to her opinions in Richmond v. LA. Croson Co.40
and Shaw v. Reno, 4 1 which invalidated race-conscious remedies on the
theory that the best way to reach a racially egalitarian society is to ignore
race. 42 Even in the case where she surprisingly allowed race-based
affirmative action in higher education, she foreshadowed "post-racialism"
by declaring that race-consciousness would surely be unnecessary in
twenty-five years.
It should come as no surprise, then, that majorities including O'Connor
were usually race-silent in the criminal procedure context, even when
addressing overt racism. For example, the Ferguson v. City of Charleston
case involved a South Carolina hospital that threatened forty-two womenforty-one black women and one white woman-with prosecution for drug
37. See e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 869-76 (describing and critiquing use of racial
profiles as part of drug war); Kevin R. Johnson, The Casefor African American and Latina/o
Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 341-46
(2003); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males: Stopped,
Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 439-42
(2004).
38. See Bernard Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling:A Critique of the Economics, Civil
Liberties, and ConstitutionalLiterature, and of CriminalProfiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1275, 1282 (2004); Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 18, at 2073-75
(2011).
39. See Harcourt,supra note 38, at 1282 (demonstrating the problem of increased crime
by whites who are not as heavily surveiled and disproportional minority arrests); Jeremiah
Wagner, Racial (De)Profiling: Modeling a Remedy for Racial Profiling After the School
Desegregation Cases, 22 LAW & INEQ. 73, 104 (2004); Jonathan R. DeFosse, Note, Asian
Americans, Racial Profiling,and National Security, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 184 (2002).
40. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
41. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
42. For critiques of this view on the ground that it ignores the ongoing racial effects of
past de jure and de facto discrimination, see Stephen E. Gottlieb, Sandra Day O'Connor's
Position on Discrimination, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 241, 244-47
(2004) (noting that O'Connor's Grutter decision upholding affirmative action in education did
so out of deference to respected employers, not out of realization of continuing effects of past
and present discrimination); L6pez, supra note 2 (linking "post-racialism" to racial
stratification).
43. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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use during pregnancy." The white nurse who had created the program was
quoted as saying she was opposed to "race-mixing" and the only white
woman prosecuted was in a relationship with a black man.45 Justice Stevens,
who dissented in the aforementioned anti-affirmative action cases, wrote an
opinion that never mentions race, yet strikes down the program as
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because its purported special
need for avoiding the probable cause requirement was actually an ordinary
law enforcement interest.46 In other words, Stevens addressed racism in a
race-silent manner. This article will demonstrate that Gant, another Stevens
opinion, is race-silent. It will also show why that is not a good thing.

II.

CASE STUDY: GANT'S RACE-SILENT REMEDY FOR RACIAL PROFILING

This Part of the Article considers the race-silence in search incident to
arrest doctrine. It first traces the development of the doctrine into separate
strands represented by Rabinowitz's allowance of broad searches and
Chimel's narrower view of searches. It then identifies how the Mindless
Square of cases undoes the Chimel approach. Next it follows the road to
Gant's restriction of Belton. Finally, it discusses the ways that Gant is a
post-racial opinion.
A.

The Rabinowitz Approach Versus the Chimel Approach

As does much of criminal procedure, search incident to arrest doctrine
begins with the Weeks v. United States case, which announced that evidence
obtained in contravention of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded, and,
in dicta, discussed the right to search a person incident to her arrest. 4 7 The
Prohibition-era Carroll v. United States48 case then allowed the police to
strip a car in search of bootleg liquor, principally upon grounds that
warrants were impracticable for vehicles.49 After Carroll, the Court swung
back and forth on the scope of searches incident to arrest. The Agnello v.
United States Court asserted the search incident to arrest included the
"place" of the arrest.o In the Marron v. United States" case, the Court
44.

Bryony J. Gagan, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, South Carolina: "FetalAbuse,"

Drug Testing, and the FourthAmendment, 53 STAN. L. REV. 491, 498 (2000).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
locality
50.

Id. at n.40.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147-51 (1925).
Id. at 153 (no warrant required because the "vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
or jurisdiction").
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
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limited the search to "items used to carry on the criminal enterprise," which
seemed to constrict the search incident to arrest right.5 2 The Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States" and United States v. Lejkowitz5 4 cases then
followed Marron. Yet, in Harris v. United States," the Court upheld a
search of an entire apartment, including a sealed envelope found in a desk
drawer.5 6 Nonetheless, in Trupiano v. United States, 7 the Court required
law enforcement to procure a warrant, whenever possible, before searching
the premises." That set the stage for attempts to stabilize the doctrine in
Rabinowitz and Chimel.
1.

Rabinowitz

The Rabinowitz case has come to stand for the proposition that there
ought to be a broad right to search incident to arrest. For instance, as will be
noted, current Justice Antonin Scalia cites Rabinowitz for the proposition
that officers may make a general search of a car for evidence relating to the
crime of arrest incident to having probable cause to arrest.59 In Rabinowitz
itself, the defendant seemed to be in the business of selling counterfeit
stamps.60 Incident to arresting Rabinowitz, officers conducted a thorough
search of the entire premises, including a desk, file cabinet, and safe.6 ' The
search lasted about ninety minutes.6 2
The Rabinowitz Court asserted that a search of a person being arrested is
constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on long-

51. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (citing Carroll,267 U.S. at 158;
Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).
52. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969) (quoting Marron, 275 U.S. at 199).
53. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931) (failure to seek
search warrant despite ability to do so defeats seizures incident to arrest).
54. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932) (invalidating searches of desk
drawers and cabinet incident to arrest).
55. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1947) (finding that the search should
not depend upon the "fortuitous circumstance [s]" of the room in which the arrest took place or
that the checks were items that could be hidden and therefore might be looked for in small
areas).
56. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 757-58 (citing Harris,331 U.S. at 151).
57. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (citing Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948)); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932); Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at
358; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925)).
58. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 758-59 (citing Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 705).
59. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 57 (1950).
61. Id. at 58-59.
62. Id. at 59.
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standing precedents.63 Authority to further search the premises where the
arrest was made had two bases. First, the right to search the premises
stemmed from the right to search the person, which could take place on the
premises.64 Second, and crucially, the right to search the premises for
evidence of guilt was time-worn.6 5 Together these bases made a general,
evidence-gathering search of premises incident to arrest constitutionally
reasonable.66 Contrary cases, argued the Rabinowitz Court, condemned only
"general exploratory searches," which are invalid even with a warrant.6 7
In addressing the defendant's claim that the search of his premises
required not only probable cause to arrest, but also a warrant, the
Rabinowitz Court reveals its motive for finding a search of premises
reasonable. It rejects the Trupiano requirement of getting a warrant
whenever it is practical on grounds that law enforcement officers need
flexibility in their "daily battle with criminals." 68 Based on that concern for
facilitating law enforcement, the Rabinowitz Court credits the police with a
thumb on the scale when balancing the reasonableness of an intrusion
versus an individual's privacy.69
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent begins by citing Judge Learned
Hand for the proposition that a person's right of privacy against arrest "is
altogether separate from the interest in protecting his papers from
indiscriminate rummage . . . ."'o The reason that distinction matters to
Frankfurter is that he conceives of the search incident to arrest exception to
the warrant requirement as narrow.' The search incident to arrest rule is
limited to situations where it is necessary to "protect the arresting officer,"
"deprive the prisoner of potential means of escape," or "avoid destruction of
evidence."72 Consequently, the search is to be only of "the person and those
immediate physical surroundings which may fairly be deemed to be an
extension of his person." 73 This criticism of Rabinowitz as confusing the
grounds for searching a person incident to arrest and those for searching
premises incident to arrest hits its mark.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
732, 735
71.
72.
73.

Id at 60 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147).
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id
Id. at 62.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 176 F.2d
(2d Cir. 1949)).
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.at 72-73.
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Frankfurter continues the argument that the Rabinowitz majority is
confused by providing a genealogy of the search incident to arrest doctrine.
First, says Frankfurter, the Weeks Court merely assumed-in dicta-that "to
search the person of the accused when legally arrested . . . has been

uniformly maintained in many cases."" Next, the Carroll Court said,
"[w]hen a man is legally arrested . . . whatever is found upon his person or

in his control which is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to
prove the offense may be seized."75 Finally, those statements were
"uncritically expanded" when the Agnello" Court jumped to the conclusion
that "[t]he right . . . to search the place where the arrest is made . . . is not to

be doubted."7 7 Thus, Frankfurter's second criticism of the Rabinowitz
majority is that the authorities cited support only the right to search a person
and that which is "in such immediate physical relation to the one arrested as
to be in a fair sense a projection of his person,"7 8 not the whole premises
where the arrest takes place.7 9
Frankfurter's final criticism of the Rabinowitz majority is that it
misconceives the very notion of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. The
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to prevent "general
warrants" of the type the British had used against the colonists."
Frankfurter complains that allowing general rummaging of premises
incident to an arrest is akin to a general warrant." Frankfurter's critique,
therefore, is as thoroughgoing as any Fourth Amendment opinion, and
would rightly provide the framework for Chimel's overturning of
Rabinowitz nineteen years later.
2.

Chimel

In Chimel, police officers went to Chimel's home to arrest him on
suspicion of robbing a coin shop.82 "[O]n the basis of the lawful arrest," the
officers searched his entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the

74.
(1914)).
75,
76.
77.
30).
78.
79.
80.

Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 76 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
Id (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925)).
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (citing Carroll,267 U.S. at 158).
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 77 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Agnello, 269 U.S. at
Id. at 78.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 81.

81.

Id.

82.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969).
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garage, and a small workshop, for approximately sixty minutes." In the
master bedroom and the sewing room, officers directed Chimel's wife to
open drawers and move the contents of drawers from side to side.8 4
The Chimel majority rejects Rabinowitz, which it says stands for the
proposition that search incident to arrest extends to all areas in the general
"possession" or under the general "control" of the arrestee." For the Chimel
majority, a broad reading of Rabinowitz "can withstand neither historical
nor rational analysis." 86 Quoting Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent,
the Chimel majority deems the broad reading of Rabinowitz to be the result
of a "hint," transformed into "dictum," then calcified into a "decision.""
Moreover, says the Chimel majority, Rabinowitz's rationale was
undercut even by analogy to the Supreme Court's new, more flexible test
for reasonableness, as exemplified by the Terry v. Ohio decision." The
Chimel majority saw searches incident to arrest as similar to a Terry frisk,
which may follow a temporary detention. The Chimel majority notes that a
Terry frisk is only justified by officer safety and prevention of the
destruction of evidence and thus its scope is limited to a protective search
for weapons or evidence on the suspect's person or within her immediate
control.89 Such a rationale for Terry stops suggests that searches incident to
arrest should also be limited to the suspect's person and the area within her
immediate control. 0 "Immediate control," says the Chimel majority is
limited to "the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence." 9 1 There is no justification "for searching
through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas," even in the
very room where the suspect is arrested.92 So, searches incident to arrest
extend only so far as the person's "immediate control," and not to areas
more broadly in his possession.
A further reason for this limitation bears special note with respect to the
use of searches incident to arrest to racially profile. The Chimel majority
declares that "one result of decisions such as Rabinowitz and Harris is to
give law enforcement officials the opportunity to engage in searches not
justified by probable cause, by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 754.
Id.
Id. at 760.
Id.
Id.
Id at 762; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

89.

Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.

90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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suspects at home rather than elsewhere."93 This concern with pretext
searches, while arguably not in the core of the holding, helps explain how
Chimel should be applied today. Unfortunately, the Court would soon turn
its back on any concern with pretext in the Robinson decision.
The "Mindless Square": How Robinson, Belton, Whren, and

B.

Atwater Undo Chimel
The Robinson decision is an important search incident to arrest case not
because it allows a broad search of the person of the arrestee but because it
purportedly bars any consideration of the officer's subjective reasons for
searching. It extends Chimel by applying search incident doctrine to both
the person and her grabbable area. Yet, the Robinson decision is a "sea
change" in that it links the discretionary search incident to arrest to a
necessity for the Court to ignore officers' subjective motivations for their
actions. This section of the Article traces the path from Robinson's alleged
application of Chimel, to Belton's presumption that the Chimel test is met,
to the rejection of limiting the bases upon which officers may arrest in
Whren, to the rejection of limiting when officers may arrest in Atwater.
Extending Dripps' concept of the Iron Triangle, I refer to these four cases as
the Mindless Square. It is by means of leaving the officer's state of mind
out of the area under consideration that these cases undo Chimel.
1.

Robinson

In United States v. Robinson,94 Officer Jenks stopped Robinson's
automobile and arrested him for operating the vehicle after his permit had
been revoked and obtaining the permit by misrepresentation. 95 Pursuant to
police department standard operating procedure, Jenks patted Robinson
down. He felt an object in Robinson's coat pocket, reached into the pocket,
pulled out what turned out to be a crumpled cigarette package, opened the
package, and found fourteen gelatin capsules of heroin.96 At the federal
Court of Appeals, Robinson argued that Officer Jenks may have used the
traffic violation arrest as a "mere pretext for a narcotics search," which
would not have been authorized by a neutral magistrate had Jenks sought a
warrant.97 The Court of Appeals accepted the officer's denial of such
93.

Id. at 767.

94. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
95. Id. at 220.
96.

Id. at 221-23.

97.

Id. at 221 n.1.
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motive, but still found that the heroin was obtained as a result of an
unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment.98
The Robinson majority upholds the search. It first notes the affirmative
authority permitting the broad police power to search the arrestee incident
to lawful arrest.99 Prior courts, it says, made clear their categorical
recognition of the validity of the search incident to lawful arrest in Weeks"oo
and then Agnello.'o' The Robinson Court contends that the Chimel Court
further acknowledged the broad authority to search a person incident to

arrest.102
Next, the Robinson Court distinguishes the purpose, scope, and character
of a search incident to an arrest from a protective frisk for weapons pursuant
to Terry v. Ohio.'o3 Although the search incident to arrest is justified
partially due to officer safety, it is also justified on other grounds and
therefore may be a relatively extensive search of the arrestee.' 04 A Terry
frisk, in contrast, is justified solely by a search for weapons, and so must be
limited by that rationale.'o Moreover, the character of the search incident to
arrest can be distinguished from a Terry frisk. An arrest marks the
commencement of a criminal prosecution, is intended to vindicate society's
interest in having its laws obeyed, and is accompanied by future
interference with an individual's liberty.' 06 In contrast, a protective frisk
constitutes a brief intrusion.o 7
Most importantly for our purposes, the majority argues that a bright line
rule is necessary in the search incident to arrest context. First, the Court
notes that Terry does not narrow the broad search incident to arrest doctrine
because the search incident to arrest is justified by both the need to disarm
the suspect and the need to preserve evidence at trial.'o Moreover, all
arrests pose a danger to an officer who is exposed to the suspect for an
98. Id (citing United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1088 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
99. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224-26.
100. Id. at 224-25 ("It is not an assertion of the right on the part of the Government, always
recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally
arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.") (quoting Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
101. Id at 225 ("The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons
lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in
order to find and size [sic] things connected with the crime as its fruits . . . is not to be
doubted.") (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)).
102. Id at 225-26 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)).
103. Id. at 227.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 227-28.
106. Id. at 228.
107. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)).
108. Id. at 234.
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extended period of time, so all arrests should be treated alike for the
purpose of search justification. 09 The Court accurately notes that "[t]he
danger to the police officer flows from the proximity, stress and uncertainty
of the arrest, and not from the grounds for arrest.""o Finally, the Court does
not agree that the constitutionality of a search incident to arrest must be
litigated on a case-by-case basis, because a police officer must make a
quick, ad hoc judgment of how and where to search."' The authority to
search, "while based on the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does
not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a
particular arrest situation" of whether evidence would be found or that the
suspect was dangerous." 2 The Court therefore upholds the constitutionality
of the search despite the fact that Officer Jenks "did not indicate any
subjective fear of the respondent or that he did not himself suspect that
respondent was armed."l' "Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which
gives rise to the authority to search," the subjective state of mind of the
police officer is of no concern to the Court.1' 4 This is the case where the
Court first established the principle that the Fourth Amendment is only
concerned with objective reasonableness, despite the likelihood that this
narrow view would result in pretextual searches."' While not directly
addressing the pretext issue and the officer's subjective mindset, the Court
effectively decides and forecloses the discussion by holding that, so long as
an intrusion is lawful, a search incident to arrest requires no additional
justification.
Justice Marshall dissents in Robinson and argues that the majority's
approach "represents a clear and marked departure from our long tradition
of case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment.""' Justice Marshall rebuts the majority's
rationale on grounds that the Fourth Amendment is meant to limit police
officers. He argues that the majority's reluctance to "overrul[e] the 'quick
ad hoc judgment' of the police officer is thus inconsistent with the very
function of the Amendment to ensure that the quick ad hoc judgments of
109. Id. at 234-35.
110. Id.at 234, n.5.

111. Id. at 235.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 236.
114. Id.
115. Given the ideology and famously strategic nature of Rehnquist, perhaps allowing
pretext was a goal of his majority opinion in Robinson. See generally Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
116. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
117. Id. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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police officers are subject to review and control by the judiciary.""' While
there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, the search incident to arrest
being one, an exception does not "preclude further judicial inquiry into the
reasonableness of the search."l'
Marshall also argues that the majority's refusal to conduct a case-by-case
analysis of the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest will fail as a
matter of practical application.' 2 0 Because the decision to issue a citation or
make an arrest is subject to officer discretion, "[t]here is always a
possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search
warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search."l21
Marshall points out that case-by-case adjudication will always be necessary
to determine if a full arrest was effected for purely legitimate reasons or,
rather, as a pretext for searching the arrestee" as "'an arrest may not be used
as a pretext to search for evidence."'l 22 This last argument represents
resistance to the eventual Whren rule that pretext is usually allowed, at least
where officers have probable cause.
2.

Belton

The movement from Rabinowitz to Chimel to Robinson sets the stage for
analysis of the application of the search incident to arrest rule to vehicles.
The question of the scope of a search incident to arrest of a vehicle
remained open. If the Chimel rule were applied, police would only be able
to search the car while it was in the "immediate control" of the suspect. In
Belton, the Court did purport to apply the Chimel rule but did so in a way
that would prove controversial. The Belton presumption that the entirety of
a vehicle is within the immediate control of an arrestee would be overturned
by the Gant decision.
In New York v. Belton, a police officer pulled over a vehicle for
speeding.'2 3 While asking for the driver's license and automobile
registration, the police officer smelled burnt marijuana and saw an
enveloped marked "Supergold," which he associated with marijuana.' 24 He
118. Id. at 242.
119. Id. at 243; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (searches incident to lawful
arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (searches in certain exigent
circumstances); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925) (searches of a moving vehicle).
120. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).
124. Id. at 455-56.
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directed the men to exit the car, arrested them for unlawful possession of
marijuana, patted each one, and split them into four areas on the highway.'25
He then searched the passenger compartment of the car and found a black
leather jacket with cocaine in the pocket. 12 6
The Belton majority first contends that Chimel's "immediate control"
limitation on the scope of a search incident to arrest is difficult to apply in
the vehicle context. 12 7 The Court then contends the protections of the Fourth
Amendment "can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of
rules" which "make[] it possible to reach a correct determination
beforehand" as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified.12 8 The police
need a "single familiar standard" as guidance because they only have
limited time and expertise to balance the social and individual interests
involved.'2 9 In search of that standard, the Belton Court assumed that any
articles within the passenger compartment are "generally, if not inevitably"
within the immediate control of the arrestee, justifying a search of the entire
passenger compartment of the vehicle including both open and closed
containers.1 30 According to the Court, it is immaterial whether the container
could hold a weapon or contraband since upon a lawful arrest, "a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." 3 ' Because the
arrest was lawful, the search immediately followed the arrest, and the jacket
was located inside the passenger compartment in which Belton had been a
passenger just prior to arrest, the search of the jacket was a valid search
incident to lawful custodial arrest and did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.'3 2
Justice Brennan dissented and accused the majority of "turn[ing] its
back" on the product of the careful analysis in Chimel.'33 For Brennan, the
rationale of the Chimel exception to the warrant requirement was to protect
the safety of the arresting officer and preserve easily destructible
evidence. 3 4 The standard was narrowly tailored and placed both temporal
and spatial limitations on a search incident to arrest, only permitting a
warrantless search when the search "is substantially contemporaneous with
125. Id at 456.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 458.
128. Id. (citing Wayne R. LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized
Procedures":The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142 (1974)).
129. Id. (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
130. Id. at 460.
131. Id. at 461 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
132. Id. at 462-63.
133. Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 464-65 (citing Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)).
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the arrest and confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest."' 3 ' Brennan
argued that the Court disregards the above principles, fails to create a more
workable standard, and "instead adopts a fiction-that the interior of the car
is always within the immediate control of an arrestee" who was a recent
occupant of the car.136 In Brennan's view, the majority substantially expands
the scope of a search incident to lawful arrest by permitting the police to
search areas and containers the "arrestee could not possibly reach at the

time of arrest."1 37
Brennan argued that the "bright line" created is not justified for two
reasons. The first is that the mere fact of law enforcement efficiency is
insufficient in itself to justify disregarding the Fourth Amendment. 138 The
second is that the distinction is ambiguous and will create many problems
both for the police and the courts.' 3 ' Because the rule abandons the
justifications for the Chimel rule, it gives no guidance to police officers to
answer these questions themselves. 140 In contrast, Chimel provides a sound,
workable rule, which limits the search to the arrestee's person and the area
within the arrestee's immediate control. 14 1 If the police were unsure in a
close case, they could turn to the rationale underlying Chimel-to prevent
the arrestee from reaching weapons or contraband-to provide guidance. 14 2
The movement from Rabinowitz to Chimel to Robinson to Belton shows
an expansion, then contraction, then re-expansion with a vengeance of the
scope of searches incident to arrest. While Chimel promised to limit such
searches, Robinson and Belton purported to apply Chimel but in fact look
much more like the overturned Rabinowitz rationale. Robinson is defensible
because concern for officer safety and evidence is obviously triggered by
items located on the person of the arrestee. Belton is much more dubious
because it appends a broad right to search to the right to seize without
requiring any connection to the dangers justifying the search incident rule.
The Gant decision reestablishes that link, albeit while also dragging along a
Rabinowitz rationale. Yet there is another reason to be concerned about
Belton: the discretion it afforded was especially useful to racial profilers.
We will see the rule's utility for racial profilers and the failure to limit that
discretion by looking at the Whren and Atwater cases.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id at 465 (citing Stoner v. California, 379 U.S. 483, 486 (1964)).
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Id at 470.
Id
Id.at471.
Id. at 471-72.

POST-RA CIALISM

44:0113]

3.

133

Whren

While Whren is not always thought of as a search incident to arrest case,
it should be. The point of a pretext stop is to get the search incident. The
upshot of Whren is that police officers have the right to conduct a Belton
search anytime they have probable cause to suspect someone committed a
minor traffic violation. Scholars have documented that officers use probable
cause that suspects have committed a minor traffic violation as a pretext for
conducting a search for which they lack a justification.'4 3 The Whren
decision reflects the culmination of the Robinson decision's shift toward
linking the right to search incident to arrest to a requirement that the Court
ignore police officers' subjective motivations. The Whren Court relegates
concerns over racial profiling to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection clause. That relegation is part and parcel of the desire to extend
Robinson's holding on subjectivity.
In Whren, while undercover narcotics officers were patrolling a "high
drug area" of the city in an unmarked car, they became suspicious of an
S.U.V. with temporary license plates and youthful black occupants that was
waiting at a stop sign.144 The officers then witnessed the S.U.V. suddenly
turn right, without signaling, and take off at an "unreasonable" speed.'4 5 In
contravention of departmental regulations,'4 6 the officers followed and
pulled up alongside the truck, and then one of the officers approached the
vehicle.' 4 7 When the officer came up to the driver's window, he
immediately observed two large plastic bags of crack cocaine in Whren's
hand and arrested the petitioners. 148
The petitioners were charged with violating various federal drug laws
and moved to suppress the evidence on two grounds: that the initial scrutiny
had not been justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the
petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activities and that the
officers' asserted motivation for approaching the vehicle-the traffic
violation-was a pretext for an unjustified search for drugs.149 The district
court denied the motion on the grounds that the officer's actions in this case
143. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425
(1997); David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness
of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MIss. L.J. 423 (2003);
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999).
144. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
145. Id.
146. Id.at 815, 817.
147. Id.at 808-09.
148. Id
149. Id.
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were not contrary to a normal traffic stop and the petitioners were
convicted.'o The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that,
regardless of the officer's subjective intent "the stop is permissible so long
as a reasonable officer under the circumstances could have stopped the car
for the suspected traffic violation.""'
Before the Court, the petitioners argued that probable cause is not
enough to justify a seizure in the unique context of civil traffic regulations,
which are "so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with
traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible."' 5 2 This creates the temptation
for officers to use traffic stops as a means to investigate other law violations
where no grounds exist. Moreover, an officer may decide which vehicles to
stop using impermissible factors, such as race.' Due to this concern, the
petitioners contended that the justification for an ordinary traffic stop must
be whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for
the given reasons."s
Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court and first
looked to precedent to argue that the Court has "never held, outside the
context of inventory search or administrative inspection, that an officer's
motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment.""' The Court cites Robinson56 for the proposition that "a
lawful post-arrest search of the person would not be rendered invalid by the
fact that it was not motivated by the officer-safety concern that justifies
such searches."'s Scalia claims that the Court does not condone raciallyselective law enforcement but nonetheless states that such matters should be
brought under the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Fourth
Amendment.' 8 According to Scalia, "Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."'
Scalia next rebuts the "objective" standard that the petitioners propose:
whether the officer's conduct deviated materially from usual police
practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not
have made the stop for the reasons given.' 60 Scalia deems the proposed test
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id at 810.
Id
Id.
Id. at 812.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id at 814.
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to be virtually subjective on grounds that the Court would have to ask what
a typical officer would likely have thought in the given situation in order to
determine whether the present officer acted reasonably."' Scalia contends
that any such subjective analysis is barred by the Fourth Amendment on the
theory that "the Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows
certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent."' 6 2 Moreover, Scalia rebuts the petitioner's argument that precedent
supports the insistence that the police adhere to standard practices as an
objective means to root out pretext.'63 Adherence to local law enforcement
practices would result in variable search and seizure protections. 6 4 Finally,
Scalia argues that the only cases that require courts to perform a case-bycase analysis of whether subjective motivations defeat reasonableness are
searches or seizures conducted either with less than probable cause or in an
extraordinary manner.'6 ' Having been supported by probable cause of some
kind of violation, and not having been conducted in an extraordinary
manner, the stop in Whren was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.166
Scalia's Whren analysis is assailable on many grounds. First, it turns a
blind eye to racial profiling. One might think that this result would argue
against this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, especially given the
obviously quixotic nature of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment
remedy.167 Second, it is not at all clear that the Fourth Amendment should
not consider racism's influence on the choice to search or seize to affect the
reasonableness of the intrusion.16 Third, courts are well capable of
conducting reasonableness analyses, as they do in criminal law and torts
cases whenever they ask what a reasonable person would have done. Here,
however, we will focus on a fourth criticism: that Whren improperly
imports Robinson's lack of concern with subjective motivations from a
161. Id. at 815.
162. Id at 814 (emphasis in original).
163. Id. at 815.
164. Id.; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960).
165. Whren, 517 U.S. at 816-18 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740 (1984); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)).
166. Id
167. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United States: The Song
Remains the Same, in RACE LAW STORIES (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel Moran eds., 2006)
(describing how Whren decision condones racial profiling while providing only quixotic equal
protection remedies).
168. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (Seymour, C.J.,
dissenting) (opining that racism ought to be deemed to tilt to an intrusion toward
unreasonableness) (quoted in YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFACE, JEROLD ISRAEL, NANCY J.
KING, ORIN S. KERR, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 348-49 (12th ed. 2008)).
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context where the search requires no justification because it is a right
granted incident to the right to seize-Robinson-to a context where the
initial seizure is in question- Whren.
By characterizing this case as all about subjectivity, Scalia is able to
borrow Robinson's dicta endorsing pretext. The problem with that analogy
is highlighted by considering the Chimel rationales. In Robinson-type
situations, the Chimel rationales are satisfied because the safety of the
officer and evidence is obviously threatened by close contact. In Whrentype situations, however, the Chimel rationales will usually not be satisfied,
given that officers almost always choose to make a brief stop followed by a
mere citation rather than an arrest. By means of this avoidance of the
Chimel principles, Whren brought about a vast expansion of police officer
discretion to use their search incident to arrest power in racially
discriminatory ways.
When we see Whren as a search incident to arrest case, we are able to
understand the litigation as a failed attempt to rein in police discretion.
Whren was an attempt to limit the times when police could arrest, and
thereby limit the times when they could search. Another attempt to limit
searches by limiting arrest powers was defeated in the Atwater case. But
this time, Justice O'Connor and three others vociferously dissent by
explicitly referencing the racial profiling problem.
4. Atwater
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,169 the Court reaffirmed the Whren
holding that the police may make a custodial arrest without balancing costs
and benefits on a case-by-case basis or looking at the police officer's
subjective intent, as long as the arrest was supported by probable cause. The
Atwater Court holds that this standard applies to all arrests, even if the
arrest is only for a rarely enforced minor traffic violation carrying no jail
time.170 The facts were as follows: Officer Bart Turek observed Atwater
driving her truck with her son and daughter in the front seat, all without
seatbelts, which is a misdemeanor in Texas."' Turek approached the truck,
yelled something to the effect of "I've seen you before. You're going to
jail," and called for backup.172 Turek refused Atwater's request to take her
children to a neighbor before going to jail. Luckily, a friend soon arrived
and took Atwater's "frightened, upset, and crying" children to a nearby
169.
170.
171.
172.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
Id. at 354.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 324.

44:0113]

POST-RA CIALISM

137

house.173 She was soon taken before a magistrate and released on $310
bond.174 Atwater was charged and pleaded no contest to the misdemeanor
seatbelt offenses, paid a $50 fine, and the charges were dismissed. 7 1
Atwater filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the City had violated her
"Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure."' The
Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the Fourth Amendment
limits police officer authority to arrest without a warrant for minor criminal
offenses."'

The Court, per Justice Souter, rejects Atwater's claim and holds that the
arrest was constitutional through an extensive analysis of founding-era
English and American common law as well as by stating that police officers
need a clear, unambiguous rule to apply on the streets. It should be noted
that most of the Atwater Court's history has been soundly refuted by legal
historian Thomas Davies.' 78
Nonetheless, the Atwater Court has a second, ahistorical rationale. It
addresses Atwater's suggested rule, which would forbid "custodial arrest,
even upon probable cause, when conviction could not ultimately carry jail
time and when the government shows no compelling need for immediate
detention."' 7 9 The Court notes that on these facts, balancing Atwater's
freedom from "indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the
City can raise against it."'" However, the Court contends that case-by-case

balancing is traditionally disfavored and, while admitting that, at first
glance, Atwater's argument is clear and simple, contends complications will
arise immediately upon application."' The Court rejects Atwater's first
proposal, which would differentiate between offenses that are "jailable" and
"fine-only," on grounds that an officer on the street might not be able to
distinguish between the two.'82 This seems to characterize officers as stupid,
but in order to grant them wider latitude. For the Atwater majority, the
second proposed rule, requiring police to routinely determine the lawfulness
of an arrest, is difficult to administer and guarantees an increase in

173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 325.

177. Id. at 326.
178. Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Characterof Law and Order Originalism:A Case
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-EraArrest doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002).
179. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346.
180. Id. at 347.
181. Id. at 347-48.
182. Id. at 348-49.
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litigation.' In the Atwater Court's view, the third proposed rule, which
would mandate that the police not arrest in a close call, is itself ambiguous
and would result in "[a] systematic disincentive to arrest."l8 4 Moreover, the
Court contends: "we could not seriously expect that when events were
unfolding fast, an officer would be able to tell" whether the suspect's
conduct qualified under any of the proposed exceptions.' Again, the Court
describes police as overwhelmed by constitutional analysis but only in order
to increase their discretion.
The Atwater majority opinion is a monument to the privileging of law
enforcement desires over privacy interests. Souter admits the arrest was a
"gratuitous humiliation[],""' but, essentially, holds the seizure to be
"individually unreasonable, . . . constitutionally reasonable."' The reason
for that strange result? According to the majority, "Courts attempting to
strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the
Government's side with an essential interest in readily administrable
rules."' That sounds like it places the proverbial thumb on the proverbial
scale. In privileging law enforcement efficiency and devaluing the reason
the officer arrested Atwater (to gratuitously humiliate her), Souter's opinion
completes the Mindless Square.
C.

The Road to Gant

This article argues that O'Connor's dissent in Atwater is the true
beginning of the road away from Belton. It is fundamentally different from
the Atwater majority in that it frankly acknowledges the problem with
excessive arrest power: racial profiling through searches incident to arrest.
O'Connor argues that the majority's opinion is not clearly supported by
precedent, inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, and will grant police
officers broad discretion.'8 9

183. Id. at 350.
184. Id. at 350-51.

185. Id. at 351 n.22.
186. Id. at 346.
187. Arnold H. Loewy, Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 535, 560 (2002); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIONS (4th ed. 2005) (noting this irony).

188. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347.
189. Id.
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1. O'Connor's Atwater Dissent
O'Connor first notes that on the rare occasions that the Court has
considered the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest for a fine-only
misdemeanor, it has "indicated disapproval." 9 0 She notes that while in
United States v. Watson,91 there was a "clear and consistently applied
common law rule permitting warrantless felony arrests," there is no clear
and consistently applied common law rule governing warrantless
misdemeanor arrests.192 Consequently, the Court must engage in the
balancing test required by the Fourth Amendment. 93 When that is done,
"[a]ny realistic assessment of the interests implicated by such arrests
demonstrates that probable cause alone is not a sufficient condition."l94 She
then argues that Whren is not at odds with this proposition, as Whren held
only that "when there is probable cause to believe that a person has violated
a minor traffic law, there can be little question that the state interest in law
enforcement will justify the relatively limited intrusion of the traffic
stop."l95
O'Connor deems Whren inapt here because justifying a full arrest on the
same evidence as a traffic stop, "defies any sense of proportionality and is
in serious tension with the Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable
seizures." 96 First, the high toll a custodial arrest exacts on an individual's
liberty and privacy outweighs the State's limited interest in taking a person
suspected of committing a fine-only offense into custody.' 97 This is
especially true "in light of the availability of citations to promote the State's
interest when a fine-only offense has been committed."' 98 O'Connor
suggests that in these situations, the police officer should issue a citation,
unless the officer can point to "specific and articulable facts" that would
"reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion" of a full custodial arrest.199
O'Connor then refutes the majority's concern for clarity by noting that
the need for officers to be certain of what they are allowed to do by no
means "trumps the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of the
190. Id. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
191. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
192. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 362-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Watson, 423 U.S. at
417-22).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 363.
195. Id. at 364.

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.

Id. at 365.
Id.
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
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Amendment's protections."20 0 For arrests in fine-only situations, application
of the Terry rule appropriately responds to "the Fourth Amendment's
command of reasonableness and sensitivity to competing values protected
by that Amendment."20 1 Moreover, "the Terry rule has been workable and
easily applied by officers on the street."2 0 2 Finally, the concerns for officer
certainty as to what is allowable are better resolved by application of the
doctrine of qualified immunity in a subsequent civil suit.203
Ultimately, O'Connor's Atwater dissent protests that the "perse rule that
the Court creates has potentially serious consequences for the everyday
lives of Americans." 204 Her "concerns lie not with the decision to enact or
enforce these laws, but rather with the manner in which they may be
enforced."20 5 O'Connor's language is eloquent on this point:
Under today's holding, when a police officer has probable cause to
believe that a fine-only misdemeanor offense has occurred, that
officer may stop the suspect, issue a citation, and let that person
continue on her way. Or, if a traffic violation, the officer may stop
the car, arrest the driver, search the driver, search the entire
passenger compartment of the car including any purse or package
inside, and impound the car and inventory all of its contents.

Although the Fourth Amendment expressly requires that the latter
course be a reasonable and proportional response to the
circumstances of the offense, the majority gives officers unfettered
discretion to choose that course without articulating a single
reason why such action is appropriate.
Such unbounded discretion carries with it grave potential for
abuse. . . . Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling

demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction
may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an

individual.After today, the arsenal available to any officer extends
to a full arrest and the searches permissible concomitant to that
arrest. An officer's subjective motivations for making a traffic stop
are not relevant considerations in determining the reasonableness
of the stop. But it is precisely because these motivations are
beyond our purview that we must vigilantly ensure that officers'

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 366.
Id.
Id
Id. at 367.
Id.

205. Id at 371-72.
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poststop actions-which are properly within our reach-comport
with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of reasonableness. 206
Justice O'Connor thereby warned the Court of the dangers of unfettered
police discretion, the potential abuse of pretextual searches, and the need to
limit these searches through objective means.
O'Connor's concern in her Atwater dissent is that officer discretion
under Belton and Whren is too likely to lead to abuse. As evidence, she
points to racial profiling: "Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling
demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often
serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual."20 7 Her
reference to racial profiling is somewhat surprising given that her opinions
in Croson and Shaw suggest that she believes that racism is either no longer
prevalent or does not justify race conscious remedies.208 In contrast,
O'Connor's Atwater dissent suggests that race-based police harassment
both continues to exist and requires a remedy. The Gant decision would
eventually limit the impact of selective enforcement by means of Belton
searches but in the post-racial way of not mentioning the racial profiling
problem.
2.

Thornton

Before we reach Gant, though, we need to read the case that people
acknowledge as its ancestor: Thornton v. United States.2 09 Specifically, we
need to consider Scalia's concurrence therein, which identifies problems
with Belton that Gant would address. In Thornton, the Court held the Belton
rule applies to "recent occupants" of a vehicle.2 10 In the case, the officer ran
a check on Thornton's license tags, which revealed that the tags had been
issued to another vehicle. 21' Before the officer had an opportunity to pull
Thornton over, the petitioner drove into a parking lot, parked and got out of
the vehicle.2 12 The officer then pulled in behind Thornton, got out of the car,
and searched the petitioner. 213 After finding marijuana and crack cocaine on
206. Id. at 372 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
207. Id.
208. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989).
209. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
210. Id. at 617.
211. Id. at 618.
212. Id. This may have been an unsuccessful case of a suspect trying to "game" the Fourth
Amendment. See Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply:
Challengingthe Gamesmanship Model of CriminalProcedure,54 BUFF. L. REv. 1483 (2007).

213. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618.
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Thornton's person, the officer handcuffed him and secured him in the back
seat of the patrol car.214 The officer then searched Thornton's vehicle and
found a handgun under the driver's seat.215
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and first cited Belton
as establishing a "clear rule for police officers and citizens alike." 2 16
Rehnquist claimed that in Belton the Court did not rely on when the officer
initiated contact with the defendant, and so the scope of the search is not
determined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the officer's
discretion or whether the officer initiated contact while the arrestee
remained in the car.217 Rehnquist added that the arrest of a suspect who is
next to a vehicle presents identical concerns, namely the risk of danger to
the arresting officer and the destruction of evidence, as the arrest of one
who is inside a vehicle.2 18
The Court considered the fact that the defendant in this case could not
possibly have accessed the place the gun was found to be immaterial. 2 19 The
need for a bright line rule justified the generalizations established in Belton
(that the passenger compartment is generally within the immediate control
of the arrestee), and so it is reasonable to allow officers to search the entire
passenger compartment once probable cause to arrest is established.22 0
Justice O'Connor concurred in part to express her dissatisfaction with the
law in the Belton area, where she believed Belton's shaky foundation had
led lower courts to devolve the search incident to lawful arrest exception to
the warrant requirement into a police entitlement.22 1 She concluded that
Justice Scalia's proposal rested on firmer ground, but she was reluctant to
adopt the proposal because neither the Government, nor the petitioner had a
chance to argue the merits of Scalia's rule.222
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but argued that the Court's
application of the Chimel/Belton rule to this case stretches the search
incident to lawful arrest "beyond its breaking point" as the petitioner here
was neither in nor anywhere near the passenger compartment of the
214. Id.
215. Id
216. Id at 620.

217. Id. at 620-21.
218. Id. at 621 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973)). In a
footnote, the Court rejected the defendant's proposed "contact initiation" rule, which would
limit the scope of Belton to recent occupants who are within reaching distance of the car
because it was outside the questions on which the Court granted certiorari and was not
addressed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 622 n.2.
219. Id. at 622.
220. Id. at 623.
221. Id. at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
222. Id.
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vehicle.2 23 In the first section of his concurrence, Scalia recognized and
rejected three possible justifications for searching Thornton.2 24 The first
justification was that, despite being handcuffed and secured in the back of a
squad car, the petitioner might have escaped and retrieved a weapon or
evidence from his vehicle. 225 Scalia noted that such a Houdini-esque escape
had only happened once in the previous thirteen years. 2 26 The second
justification was that the officer should not be penalized for taking the
sensible precaution of securing the suspect in the car first even though he
could have conducted the search at the time of arrest. 2 27 Scalia rejected this
argument because it presumes that a search incident to lawful arrest is a
police entitlement, not an exception, justified by necessity. 228 Scalia went so
far as to say that if an officer left a suspect free only to justify a search, that
would make the search constitutionally unreasonable. 2 29 It is hard to believe
in light of his Whren opinion, but Scalia says, "Indeed, if an officer leaves a
suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture authority to search, one
could argue that the search is unreasonable precisely because the dangerous
conditions justifying it existed only by virtue of the officer's failure to
follow sensible procedures." 230 The third justification was that while the
arrestee posed no risk in this case, Belton searches generally are reasonable,
and so the bright-line rule comes to the right conclusion the majority of the
time. In fact, Scalia noted, the rule yields the incorrect result the majority
of the time. In virtually all cases "a motorist is handcuffed and secured in
the back of a squad car" and therefore poses no risk of danger to the officer
or evidence.2 32
Scalia nonetheless concludes that Belton searches are still justifiable, but
simply because the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for
which the suspect was arrested.2 33 Scalia cites precedent, such as Rabinowitz
and (supposedly) Chimel,234 where the Court did not justify a search
incident to lawful arrest as a means to prevent concealment or destruction of
evidence, but rather justified the searches as necessary to find evidence of
223. Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
224. Id.
225. Id at 625-26.
226. Id. at 626.

227. Id.
228. Id
229. See id. at 627.

230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 627-28.
233. Id.
234. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). One can only assume that Scalia's
characterization of Chimel as supporting the Rabinowitz general search was wishful thinking.
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the crime for which the suspect was arrested.23 5 Scalia further cites late
nineteenth and early twentieth century authorities mentioning the same
idea.236 In Scalia's view, only in the years leading up to Chimel did the
Court begin to reference the concerns regarding the concealment and
destruction of evidence.23 7 Scalia argues that the Court should "at least be
honest" and concede that Belton is not a mere application of Chimel, but
rather it is a return to the broader search incident to arrest permitted before
Chimel.2 38 Recasting Belton in this way would distinguish the rules when
officer safety is at issue and when the state is merely interested in evidence
gathering.2 39 Scalia would thus limit Belton searches to cases where it is
reasonable to believe evidence might be found in the vehicle.240 in
Thornton, it was reasonable to believe that evidence of a drug offense
would be found in the vehicle from which the defendant had just alighted
and so he would uphold the search.24 1
3.

Gant

Finally, then, we are brought to the Gant case. Therein, after Gant was
arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the
back of the patrol car, two police officers searched his car and discovered a
gun and cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.242 Gant moved to
suppress the evidence seized from his car on the grounds that Belton did not
authorize the search because the defendant posed no threat to the officers
and no evidence of the crime of arrest could be found in his vehicle.2 43 The
Arizona Supreme Court held that, while Belton defined the scope of the
search incident to arrest, Chimel stated the rationale for the search incident
to arrest exception, namely to protect officer safety and to preserve

evidence.2 44
Justice Stevens, who dissented in Thornton, delivered the opinion of the
Gant Court and held the search unjustified because there was no reason to
believe either that Gant could have accessed weapons or evidence at the
time of the search or that evidence of the crime of arrest would be found in
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 629-30.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).
Id. at 336.
Id.
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the car.2 45 Stevens begins his analysis by addressing the reasonableness of a
warrantless search and noting that the search incident to lawful arrest
exception derives from the interests in evidence preservation and officer
safety.2 4 6 Chimel defines the grounds for the search and ensured that the
scope of the search is commensurate with its purposes.24 7
Stevens then discussed Belton, where the Court defined the "area within
the immediate control" of an occupant of an automobile.2 48 Based largely on
the assumption that articles inside the passenger compartment of an
automobile are generally within the immediate control of the arrestee, the
Belton Court held that a police officer could search the entire passenger
compartment of an automobile and all containers therein upon arrest. 24 9
Despite the limited holding in Belton, lower courts had adopted the broad
reading of the case, which states that a vehicle need not be within an
arrestee's reach to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest. 25 0 This broad
reading of Belton permits police officers to search a vehicle incident to
arrest even where there is no possibility that the arrestee could gain access
to the vehicle, and effectively grants police an "entitlement" to search a
vehicle incident to every arrest.2 51 Stevens notes that this reading untethers
the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception.2 52
The Gant Court thus rejects the broad reading of Belton and holds that
the Chimel rationale authorizes a search incident to arrest only when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment or where it is "reasonable to believe" that evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. 253 The Court thus not only
adopts the Chimel rationale for searches incident to lawful arrest but also
incorporates Scalia's Thornton concurrence authorizing a search for
evidence of the crime of arrest.25 4 Stevens adopts Scalia's Rabinowitz
justification with a minimalist statement that it is justified by concerns that
are "sui generis" in the vehicle context.255
Stevens next provides three justifications for rejecting the State's
argument that the broad reading of Belton correctly balances law
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id at 343-44.
Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341-43.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 343.
Id
Id.
Id. at 350-51.
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enforcement interests, including the interest in a bright line rule, with the
arrestee's limited privacy interest in his vehicle.2 56 First, Stevens argues that
the State's interpretation would seriously intrude upon an individual's
privacy interest by granting the police "unbridled discretion to rummage at
will among a person's private effects."257 Second, the State exaggerates the
clarity of the broad Belton reading, which has "generated a great deal of
uncertainty" for a rule purporting to be a "bright line." 258 Finally, a broad
reading is unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary
interests since the majority's view and other established exceptions to the
warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search where safety or evidentiary
concerns are present.2 59 Stevens also rejects Justice Alito's argument that
the doctrine of stare decisis requires that the Court adhere to the broad
reading of Belton because that doctrine does not justify the continuance of
an unconstitutional police practice.2 60
Scalia concurred and argued that the Belton/Thornton rule is
unreasonable since the police virtually always have applied less intrusive
and more effective means to ensure their safety.261 Scalia believed that the
majority's standard, authorizing a search where the arrestee is within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment, fails to provide the
necessary guidance to police officers and leaves room for officer
manipulation.26 2 He echoed his Thornton concurrence and argued that the
Court should abandon the Belton/Thornton "charade" and hold that a
vehicle search incident to arrest is reasonable only when the object of the
search is for evidence of the crime of arrest.26 This formulation both
preserves the outcome of prior cases and tethers the scope and rationale of
the doctrine to the triggering event.264 Scalia, however, joins the majority
only as a means of choosing the lesser of two evils, for he believes that

256. Id. at 344-47.
257. Id. at 345.
258. Id. at 346.
259. Id. at 346-47 (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that
incident to arrest, an officer may conduct a limited protective sweep of those areas he
reasonably believes a dangerous person may be hiding); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049
(1983) (permitting an officer to search a vehicle's passenger compartment where a passenger is
dangerous or might access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) (holding that an officer may search any area of the vehicle
for which he has probable cause)).
260. Id. at 348-51.
261. Id. at 351-52.
262. Id. at 352-54.
263. Id. at 353.
264. Id.
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Justice Alito's dissent, which would have left the prior understanding of
Belton and Thornton in effect, is "plainly unconstitutional." 2 6 5
D.

Gant as a Post-racialOpinion

The Gant holding was a big deal. It has generated much commentary in
law reviews. 2 66 While the discussion has acknowledged race, it has not
recognized the extent to which race should be central to the discussion.
Police officers racially profile all the time.267 The point of racial profiling
someone is to catch them "dirty." The search incident to arrest is the
primary means of potentially catching the prey.
Justice O'Connor's Atwater dissent entered racial. profiling into the
Court's explicit discussion about searches incident to arrest. It is helpful to
recall that she specified the search incident to arrest rule as the problem: "if
a traffic violation, the officer may stop the car, arrest the driver, search the
driver, search the entire passenger compartment of the car including any
purse or package inside." 26 8 Moreover, she pinpointed what searches
incident to arrest are used for, declaring, "as the recent debate over racial
profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction
may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual."269
The fact that O'Connor made those statements, and in such a noteworthy
case, makes it hard to believe the members of the Court are not aware that
searches incident to arrest result in widespread racial profiling.
In that light, Stevens's refusal to mention race in the Gant opinion seems
to be a studied decision. While the omission could be explained in many
ways, it does seem to be a strategic choice. Why might this choice be
necessary? Because some are trying to impose a post-racial era upon us. It
has become increasingly unacceptable to mention race at all. Even when
racial disparities are the problem, broader categories of remedy are
proposed, such as class. The Gant decision's omission of reference to
O'Connor's Atwater dissent, and of race at all, is in keeping with the postracial trend.

265. Id. at 354.

266. See, e.g., Barbara E. Arnacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does it Matter?, 2009 SUP. CT. REV
275 (2010).
267. See Robin Shepard Engel, et al., Theory and Racial Profiling: Shortcomings and
FutureDirectionsin Research, 19 JUST. Q. 249 (2002).

268. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001).
269. Id.
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RACIAL PROFILING

Richardson andMiller on ContinuingPolice Prejudice

Leading criminal procedure scholar Eric Miller's contribution to this
Symposium, Detective Fiction, argues that while the Court has created a
fiction that police officers have expertise that justifies judicial deference,
the Court makes no reference to evidence of specific training and its
effectiveness. The result is that the Court promotes race-based policing.27 0
He develops that argument by distinguishing role-based versus rule-based,
authoritarian versus consensual, and craft versus managerial styles of
regulating policing. Role-based authority prizes officers' insights that are
developed in their role as crime investigators.2 7 1 Rule-based authority would
place the Constitution and Courts above the police. Moreover, the Court
facilitates an authoritarian versus a consensual style of policing. A
consensual style of policing would emphasize community cooperation in
policing based on mutual respect.272 The authoritarian model privileges
deference to police authority based on their role. 273 As I have noted in my
article "Who's the Man? ": Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police

Training," police in an authoritarian mode emphasize "order maintenance"
through deference to their authority. 27 4 Finally, Miller distinguishes between
craft and managerial authority. Craft authority emphasizes the expertise of
street police over management's regulations. 27 5 The Court's belief in streetofficer, craft-based authority leads it to defer in almost all cases to officers'
discretion, even when they violate rules set by management. As Miller says,
"if the officer is sufficiently well trained and experienced, the Court will
defer to her on-the-spot tactical judgments rather than rely upon the policy
decisions of her executive superiors or the judiciary." 2 76
For Miller, this judicial deference to authoritarian policing leads to racial
profiling because it allows the use of police officers' order maintenance
270. Miller, supra note 18, at 218.
271. Id. at 226.
272. Id. at 254; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (2003) (arguing for respect-based policing).
273. Miller, supra note 18, at 242.
274. Frank Rudy Cooper, "Who's the Man?": Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and
Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 697 (2009). For more on masculinities
studies' application to law, see MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL
APPROACH (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds.) (forthcoming Aug. 2012), especially
my chapter on the HBO drug war drama, The Wire.
275. Miller, supra note 18, at 248.
276. Id. at 224.
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techniques, including pretextual searches, for investigation. In Miller's
view, we began losing the battle against racial profiling when the Court
removed the implicit dangerousness requirement from Terry stops.2 77 That
requirement would have barred order maintenance/preventative policing
from being used as a technique of investigation.2 78 In conjunction with the
Robinson/Whren pretext approach, which leads to the Mindless Square,
allowing officers to go fishing for crime in the absence of a danger-based
necessity facilitates racial profiling. Moreover, when accepting evidence
from pretextual searches, the Court makes no effort to ascertain whether the
officer is skillful or merely lucky.27 9 As a result, anything goes, especially
racial profiling.
The primary reason that I say "especially racial profiling" is well
explained by noted criminal procedure scholar Song Richardson's article in
this symposium, Cognitive Bias, Policing, and the Fourth Amendment.
Richardson asserts, and then proves, that "as a result of psychological
biases, officers are more likely to attribute the ambiguous behaviors of
nonwhites to criminality and the identical behaviors of whites to external
factors."2 80 Note that Richardson does not assert that all, or even most,
officers are racist.2 8' She does say, however, that many people are implicitly
biased against racial minorities.2 82 That means that non-conscious
psychological processes affect people's behaviors, perceptions, and
judgments.28 3 Richardson briefly surveys the evidence and concludes such
biases significantly affect policing in the form of racial profiling.
The Fourth Amendment problem here is that the Court's thin definition
of unreasonableness facilitates police officers' reliance on their implicit
biases as a basis for deciding whom to investigate. As Richardson says,
"incentive structures within organizations can affect epistemic motivation
by encouraging or discouraging [the] information gathering" that might
reduce implicit bias.284 From the point of view of the institutional control
277. Id at 260.
278. Id. at 262.
279. Id at 232.
280. Richardson, Cognitive Bias, supra note 18, at 268.
281. But remember that if racism means stereotyping racial minorities as more likely to
commit crimes, most cops, including many racial minorities, are likely racist. See Andre
Douglas Pond Cummings, Just Another Gang. "When the Cops are Crooks Who Can You
Trust? ", 41 How. L.J. 383, 404 (1998) (describing aggressive policing based on belief that
racial minorities are more likely to commit crimes).
282. Richardson, Cognitive Bias, supra note 18, at 272 (citing Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action", 94 CALIF. L.
REv. 1063, 1072 (2006)).
283. Richardson, Cognitive Bias, supra note 18, at 272.
284. Id at 276.
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that the Court might have chosen to exercise over police officers who racial
profile, we might ask the same question Richardson does:
Allowing officers to consider race . . . communicates to officers

that it is appropriate to associate race with criminality; after all,
why else does the Court permit them to consider a target's race,
even when they do not have any specific information that a
suspect of a particular race was engaged in criminal activity?...
We might ask similar questions regarding pretext and searches incident to
arrest: Why enact the Mindless Square of cases if you don't condone racial
profiling? Why not explicitly remedy racial profiling in Gant, especially
after O'Connor's warning about it? Seemingly, because the Court is seeking
to create a post-racial era by ignoring race.
Together, Miller and Richardson reveal the scope of the racial profiling
problem. The Court's way of looking at the police, by deferring to their
authoritarian impulses under the guise of deferring to their undocumented
expertise, facilitates racial profiling. As I have demonstrated, the Mindless
Square approach to search incident to arrest doctrine is a significant part of
that permissiveness. Moreover, the Court's refusal to acknowledge implicit
bias, despite much evidence that has been presented to them, is itself a
message to officers to continue their racist practices. I argue that pretext
searches are the principal means by which implicit bias is converted into
intrusions upon racial minorities. In the face of these problems, we ought to
be critical of the Gant decision-both its Rabinowitz prong and its refusal to
consider pretext need to be reconsidered.
B.

The Gant Decision's Rabinowitz ProngMaintainsExcessive Police
Discretion

Given the significant racial profiling problem raised by search incident to
arrest doctrine, we ought to challenge the very assumptions of this doctrine.
In the context of Gant, the best way to challenge the doctrine is to ask why
the Court inserted a Rabinowitz prong. Scholar Edwin Butterfoss called for
Gant's suturing of a Rabinowitz-prong to the Chimel justifications for
searches incident to arrest as a sensible approach.286 Others felt a pure
Chimel approach was called for.287 This article agrees with the latter group.
285. Id. at 279.
286. See Butterfoss, supra note 5.
287. See Angad Singh, Stepping Out of the Vehicle: The Potentialfor Arizona v. Gant to
End Automatic Searches Incident to Arrest Beyond the Vehicular Context, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
1759 (2010). Noted scholar Jeffrey Fagan points out that at least one state Supreme Court, New
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The primary reason for objecting to the Gant decision's Rabinowitz
prong is that it is philosophically inconsistent. Simply put Rabinowitz
allows a search of the entire area that is generally in the "possession" or
generally in the "control" of the arrestee.2 88 Chimel, on the other hand,
requires that the suspect be in "immediate control" of the area to be
searched.28 9 We know that distinction is more than semantics because the
Chimel case overturns Rabinowitz. If the Gant Court were being honest, it
would choose between the Chimel and Rabinowitz rationales. It does not do
so because Scalia's vote was necessary. Scalia's Gant concurrence goes so
far as to admit he has compromised. At best, then, Gant is the result of a
sausage-making process.
The problem with the Gant decision'sRabinowitz prong is that it leaves
police with wide discretion to search. While it is true that (absent danger to
the officer or evidence) officers can no longer argue that waiting too long at
a stop sign justifies a search incident to arrest, suppose a civilian gets
distracted and strays just over the line into the next lane. In that case, the
officer could characterize her arrest as based on suspicion of drunk driving.
She could say she was searching for evidence of the crime of arrest, such as
beer cans. What is to stop courts from refusing to suppress evidence so
gained? Nothing in the Gant opinion. After all, Gant makes the search for
evidence dependent not upon probable cause or even reasonable suspicion,
but a new and undefined concept called "reasonable to believe."290 If Gant
had stuck to a Chimel rationale, the officer in my hypothetical would not get
a general search for evidence. The Gant decision thus maintains a
significant degree of the wide discretion that officers have been using to
racial profile minority motorists.2 9 1
C.

Gant Still Allows Pretext

Perhaps even more significantly, the Gant decision does not address the
heart of the racial profiling problem. If police officers only used their search
incident to arrest powers when they legitimately thought the crime justified
a search, the practice would not be nearly as offensive to the Fourth
Amendment. The central problem with the current use of searches incident
Jersey's, created a pure Chimel doctrine after Thornton under state law. State responses to Gant
warrant exploration in future work.
288. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
289. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 773 (1969).
290. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 332-33 (2009).
291. Obviously, I do not agree with Armacost's characterization of the Gant decision as
practically ending Belton searches. See Armacost, supra note 266.
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to arrest is that officers are making an end-run around the Fourth
Amendment. In common parlance, it would be considered "unreasonable"
to allow someone to do something prohibited by simply pretending she was
doing something else. When officers use the traffic stop as a pretext to do a
search they cannot justify, they are accomplishing their prohibited goal by
means of semantics. That should be deemed constitutionally unreasonable.
The central problem is that the Gant decision leaves pretext doctrine
untouched. An officer. can still seize someone for the purpose of doing a
search she cannot justify. The new rule merely makes her articulate her
pretext as a belief that the suspect was a danger to the people or evidence, or
that she would find evidence of the crime of arrest in the car. Standard
police practices make it unlikely (though not impossible) that officers can
articulate a danger rationale. But note that an officer could choose to let a
suspect she does not fear remain near the car and thereby get the automatic
Belton search of the car. While Scalia suggested such a ruse would make
the search unreasonable in his Thornton concurrence,2 92 neither he nor
Stevens refers to that idea in the Gant decision.
More importantly, the Gant decision allows pretextual articulations of a
belief that evidence would be found in the car. As the prior lane-weaving
example demonstrates, such a belief will not be particularly hard to
manufacture. Given that courts are barred from considering officers' states
of mind under Whren, the officer's stated belief will be hard to counter.
Even though the officer's belief must be reasonable, how would one
establish that it was unreasonable? Logic would suggest that one could
point out that no reasonable officer would make such a search. But Whren
characterizes such an argument as virtual subjectivity and seemingly
forecloses it.293 Consequently, Gant leaves pretext alive and well. And we
know that officers will use discretion to articulate pretext in order to racial
profile.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Having traced the problems with the Gant decision, this article concludes
with a brief outline of a potential solution. First, we must acknowledge that
post-racialism is a failure in the search incident to arrest context. The Court
cannot fully address the use of searches incident to arrest without
acknowledging that racial profiling is the heart of the problem. O'Connor's

292. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004).
293. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-15 (1996).
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Atwater dissent did that. The Gant decision fails to do so. The result is a
decision that makes it harder to racial profile but far from impossible.
Second, if we care about racial profiling, we have to limit police
discretion. To do so in the search incident to arrest context requires a return
to the heart of the Chimel approach. That means excising the Rabinowitz
prong from the Gant decision. Such a move is justified by the fact that
Chimel and Rabinowitz are inconsistent. But it is especially important
because the Rabinowitz prong will be the primary means by which officers
continue to use search incident to arrest law to racial profile.
Finally, a true return to the Chimel approach involves disabling pretext
searches by breaking apart the Mindless Square of search incident cases.
The Court could start by acknowledging that the analogy between the
Robinson and Whren situations is false. The Chimel approach might justify
a Robinson-type search incident to arrest of a person as a matter of course
based on the inherent danger to the officer from close contact with the
arrestee. But Robinson's pretext dictum does not justify the initial seizure in
Whren. Instead, all searches and seizures should be subject to an overall
reasonableness inquiry that takes racist motivations into account in the
balancing analysis.294 Remember that even Justice Scalia has opined that
leaving a suspect free for the purpose of generating a search rationale is
constitutionally unreasonable.2 95 An overall reasonableness inquiry into
whether there was a racial pretext is especially appropriate in the context of
searches incident to arrest, where the intrusion itself is granted as an
incident to the justified seizure but is not itself justified. This proposal is
hardly a modest one in the current criminal procedure context, but if we are
serious about addressing racial profiling, we will have to acknowledge race.

294. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (Seymour, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing the race-based resentment engendered by a law enforcement practice is a
factor making it unreasonable) (quoted in YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD ISRAEL,
NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 348-49 (12th ed. 2008)).

295. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2004).

